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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue #1:

Did the district court err in determining that the undisputed material

facts established that the Defendant and Plaintiffs decedent, Ms. Stamper, were coemployees at the time of the accident giving rise to this action for wrongful death?.
This issue was raised inter alia in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement (R. 118-158).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court reviews "the facts
in the light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the trial
court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Bearden v.
Croft. 201 UT 76, 31 P.3d 537 (Utah 2001) citing to Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State,
779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989).
Correctness is also the standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation.
Id; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).
Issue #2:

Did the trial court misapply the law in concluding that Plaintiffs'

claims for the wrongful death of their mother, as applied to the facts of this case, were
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers compensation act?
This issue was raised inter alia in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of
1

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement (R. 118-158.)
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. Toone v. Weber County. 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment the appellate court must determine
whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Stephens Supra, 935
P.2d at 519, quoting Wilcox v. Geneva Rocks Corporation. 911 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah
1996), quoting Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
Issue #3:

Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law that there were no

genuine issues as to any material fact as to whether Decedent and Defendant were fellow
servants or engaged in the same employment at the time of the crash and Decedent's
death?
This issue was raised in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgement (R. 118-158).
When determining whether the trial court properly found as a matter of law that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact ast to whether Decedent and
Defendant were fellow servants or engaged in the same employment at the time of the
crash and Decedent's death the appellate court must review all facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the Appellants. E.g., Robinson
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v. Mount Logan Clinic. LLC 2008 UT 21, 182 P.3d 333 (2008). Submission of evidence
must be looked at in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Salt Lake
City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc., 760 p.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l)
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive
remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against any
officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on
account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be
maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee
of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee.
Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the employee's
dependents,fromfilinga claim for compensation in those cases in
accordance with Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal in a civil casefroman order of the Fifth Judicial District Court
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, entered December 11, 2008. (R.
201-206.) Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal on January 9, 2009, and it was
entered on the District Court's docket on January 12, 2009. (R. 207-208.)
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On May 6, 2005, Rebecca Johnson was driving a Ford Explorer owned by

Gilbert Development south on 1-15 in Washington County, Utah at or near mile marker
23. (R. 5)
2.

Sharon Stamper was a passenger in that vehicle. (R. 69, 125.)

3.

Johnson negligently failed to control the vehicle in that she ran of the right

side of the road causing the vehicle to over turn. (R. 69, 125.)
4.

The Explorer rolled over one and 1/4 times and landed on the passenger

side causing Sharon Stamper to die as a result of her injuries. (R. 5.)
5.

The auto crash in question happened in such an abrupt and unexpected way

that Ms. Stamper had no opportunity to influence or exercise upon Defendant to use
proper caution. (R. 145)
6.

Defendant while allegedly driving below the speed limit simply and without

warning negligently failed to safely negotiate a turn in the road. (R. 145.)
7.

For several years prior and at the time of the accident, Sharon Stamper was

employed by Gilbert Development Corporation ("GDC"), and Rebecca Johnson was
employed by Diamond G Rodeos, Inc. ("Diamond G"). (R. 69, 120, 130, 155)
8.

Both GDC and Diamond G are closely held corporations largely or solely

owned by Steve Gilbert. (R. 69-68)
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9.

GDC is a general engineering and general contractor company generally

involved in heavy equipment leasing and land development. (R. 122, 69-68.) It has
several offices, including one in Mesquite, Nevada and one in Toquerville, Utah. (R. 127,
128.)
10.

Diamond G is a company which is involved in producing and providing

services for rodeos. (R. 154). Its main office is in Toquerville, Utah, but some of its files
are kept in Mesquite, Nevada. (R. 128, 127.)
11.

As an employee of Diamond G, Rebecca Johnson had work duties and

specialized skills that were distinct from those of Sharon Stamper; including working
with computers, welding, electrical work, and landscaping. (R. 143, 126, 67.)
12.

Additionally, Defendant Johnson was principally involved in work for

Diamond G including traveling out of state for Diamond G to help produce rodeos by
setting up arenas, checking on textures, sorting, feeding, watering and otherwise caring
for the animals, as well as doing public relations work, data entry, compiling statistics on
the animals, getting clowns and bull fighters, administering medications to the livestock,
and used equipment. (R. 155-154, 146, 130-128, 126, 121, 66.)
13.

In contrast, Ms. Stamper was heavily and principally involved in cooking

and cleaning. (R. 154, 143, 120, 67.)
14.

Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson sometimes worked together and overlapped
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tasks, but were usually engaged in different tasks and work. In the 18 months prior to the
crash, they often carpooled together from Toquerville to Mesquite. For example, Ms.
Johnson would sometimes help transport records to Toquerville and then work on Gilbert
development projects as directed by Mr. and/or Mrs. Gilbert. Johnson's duties for
Diamond G. included general business errands and anything Gilbert needed her to do. (R.
143, 67, 65-63.)
15.

For the six months prior to the crash, as an employee of Diamond G.,

Defendant Johnson drove between Toquerville and Mesquite almost every day,
sometimes with Stamper as a passenger and sometimes without Stamper. (R. 146, 64,
63.)
16.

On May 6, 2005, Johnson was expected to work on several specialized

duties, some of which would benefit the businesses of Gilbert and Diamond G, and at
least one of which would be of benefit only to Diamond G. Stamper was expected to
cook, clean, and run errands. (R. 75-74.)
17.

Johnson was paid by Diamond G. on a weekly basis for her duties, whether

she worked in Toquerville or Mesquite. (R. 155, 146.)
18.

When working on jobs where there was some crossover in job duties

performed between Johnson and Stamper, neither person supervised the work of the
other. (R. 152, 151, 143, 142, 120.)
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19.

Johnson drove any available vehicle and Stamper was always a passenger

when they rode together. (R. 136, 130-129, 127.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court ruled that Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were engaged in the
"same employment/' and that Plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred by the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. (R. 202.)
The fellow servant doctrine, as identified and interpreted by Utah Courts, was
never intended to apply to the facts of this case. Stampers' claims for the wrongful death
of their mother, a passenger in a single car rollover, cannot be barred by the Workers
Compensation Act.
Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were not fellow servants or engaged in the same
employment at the time of Ms. Stamper's death. Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were
employed by different companies, had different skill sets, and Stamper had no
opportunity to influence Johnson, the driver, to use proper caution in the short instant
leading to her death. Under these facts, they cannot properly be considered fellowservants as defined by Utah case law.
Assuming, arguendo, the fellow servant doctrine applies to this carpooling
situation, there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The
lower court ignored several genuine issues as to material facts when summarily ruling
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Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were fellow servants or engaged in the same employment
at the time of the accident leading to Ms. Stamper's death.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FELLOW SERVANT DOCTRINE WAS NEVER INTENDED TO
APPLY TO FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Generally speaking, an employee of one company may make a claim for injuries or

death against an employee of another company. The fellow servant doctrine has been
recognized as an exception to that general rule in limited situations to prevent that
recovery. The fellow servant doctrine requires that workers be in such co-association that
they may influence each other to use proper caution and safety and be situated in their
labor to the extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of each other as to
skill, diligence and carefulness. Peterson v. Fowler. 493 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah 1972).
A.

Ms. Stamper was not in an position to influence Ms. Johnson in any
way with respect to how she was driving and had no notice or warning
that she was about to negligently overturn the vehicle.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Motion relied primarily upon three cases in
making its argument for summary judgment, Peterson v. Fowler. 493 P.2d 997 (Utah
1972); Bambrough v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286, (Utah 1976); and Goheen v. Yellow
Freight Sys.. 32 F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994). These cases all involve dangerous physical
work situations where workers were laboring side by side and where the injured parties
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received their injuries as a direct result of trying to accomplish the ultimate task at hand in
co-association with the defendant who was working with them. In Peterson, the deceased
was working with others high above the ground on suspended scaffolding attending to
ceiling tile when the scaffolding collapsed and he fell to his death. In Bambrough, the
injured party was transferring lumber with another worker from one trailer to another
when part of the load fell on him causing his leg to be amputated. In Goheen, the injured
party was working with an other worker to unload a 2,000 pound crate from a truck when
it fell on her thereby causing her injury.
In these types of cases, the rule set forth in Peterson establishing what constitutes
fellow servants may be logically applied to those relevant facts. Peterson states that
fellow servants are those who "at the time of injury directly" operate "with each other in
the particular business at hand," whose "mutual duties bring them into such coassociation that they may exercise an influence upon each other to use proper caution and
be situated in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct
of each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness." 492 P.2d at 1000 (emphasis added).
The injured person in Peterson actually had the opportunity to "influence" the other
workers, including those who assembled the scaffolding, to "use proper caution."
Similarly, the injured party in Peterson was "situated in [his] labor to some extent as to be
able to supervise and watch the conduct of [other workers] as to skill, diligence and
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carefulness." Namely, he could observe the other workers as they worked and observe
the construction and subsequent use of the scaffolding.
Similarly, in Bambrough. the injured party could see how the other worker was
approaching or planning the unloading of the lumber and was positioned such that he
could make suggestions or otherwise "supervise" or "influence" how the unloading of the
lumber was to take place. The same can be said of the injured party in Goheen with
respect to the unloading of the 2,000 pound crate.
The real test or inquiry in those cases focuses upon (1) the activities engaged in at
the time of the injury, and (2) whether those separately employed employees had such coassociation at the time of injury to supervise, or influence safety or skill upon each other
to prevent the injury.
The facts in this case do not fall under the fellow servant doctrine. Ms. Stamper
and Defendant were simply carpooling to a common job site when Stamper's death
occurred. As indicated in Defendant's deposition, she was traveling ten miles below the
speed limit on a road that she was very familiar with when she approached a right handed
curve, in the rain, applied tapped her brakes, failed to negotiate the turn, and negligently
caused the vehicle to roll. (R. 145, 139.) The trial court, when finding that the two
persons were fellow servants, failed to properly apply the doctrine to the time of the
injury and failed to consider whether Stamper had any co-association relationship at that
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time to exercise control or influence on the driver.
Ms. Stamper, as a passenger, had no opportunity "at the time of the injury" to
influence Defendant to use additional caution or skill in the split second that the vehicle
began to slide when only seconds prior Defendant was exhibiting adequate capacity to
drive safely.
Further, she was not in "direct operation with Johnson in the particular business at
hand." Petersen. 493 P.2d at 1000. This scenario is not the type of scenario considered in
Peterson. Bambrough. or Goheen, where workmen were engaged in common coassociated activities at such a time and in such a manner that they were afforded the
opportunity to influence the behavior of each other in their working environment at the
moment of injury in an attempt to maintain their own safety.
B.

Defendant and Ms. Stamper were not Engaged in the "Same
Employment" as Contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court.

The Utah Supreme Court in Bambrough held that fellow servants are those
engaged in the "same employment." 552 P.2d at 1293. As discussed at length above, the
court defines those who are in the same employment as those who can influence each
other to exercise care, safety, skill, diligence, etc.
In the present case, there is ample evidence that Ms. Stamper and Defendant
simply carpooled to Mesquite together and then engaged primarily in distinct work I he
act of these two separately employed persons carpooling together happened 3-5 times per
11

week for the prior 6 months, regardless of their duties on those days. (R. 146, 127)
For example, Defendant stated in her deposition that, "I would take Gilbert
Development files with Sharon to Mesquite and hand them over to Cindy. And then me
and Steve would do Gilbert Development projects." (R. 138.)
Here, Defendant indicates that it was normal for her to separate herself from Ms.
Stamper upon arriving in Mesquite and then go and do "Gilbert Development projects"
and some Diamond G work with Mr. Gilbert. In other words, Defendant and Ms.
Stamper would carpool to Mesquite and then do independent assignments.
The most illustrative evidence showing this division of labor between Defendant
and Ms. Stamper is set forth in Ms. Gilbert's Affidavit, wherein she states:
Friday, May 6, 2005, was to have been a "finish-up" day for moving from
our previous home in Mesquite to the new home/office in the VDM
subdivision. During the week of May 2nd- 5th either Steve or myself
assigned [Defendant] a number of tasks in Mesquite, and those which I
recall included:
a.
assisting me in getting Pacer up and running so we could do
some legal research on the GDC California fraudulent conveyance case;
b.
getting the office telephone system up and running in our
Chaparral Drive offices;
c.
teaching Steve and I how to use the telephone system once it
was installed;
d.
picking up an "architectural variance" from the VDM
Homeowners' Association for Steve's review and requested approval;
e.
determining what light bulbs would work only in our "old"
house and leaving them at that home while bringing extra light bulbs that
would work in the "new" home/office to that home;
f.
ordering flowers for a executive of Sun-Cor (the entity GDC
was currently working for at Coral Canyon, Washington, Utah) who had
12

just had surgery;
g.
transporting mail and files to and from Toquerville;
h.
transporting legal supplies (bate stamp, discovery looseleafs,
boxes for shipping, etc.) to the Mesquite office;
i.
handling logistical issues for the rodeo (i.e. acquisition of
judging sheets from past rodeo/bull riding events, locating pictures of
independent contractors for publicity, verifying hotel reservations for the
Diamond "G" crew, etc.); and
j.
working with Steve as his emergencies required.
Affidavit of Cyndi W. Gilbert. (R. 137-138, 75-74.)
This list details specific chores or assignments that Defendant was to accomplish.
In other words, this list describes the work or nature of employmeiil m which Defendant
was engaged. In contrast, Ms. Gilbert's sets forth a list of chores or as assignments that
Ms. Stamper was to accomplish:
We had also sent Sharon to Mesquite during that week of May 2nd - 5th.
Sharon had been working with my mother in cleaning the previous home
and transporting items to the new home/office. Sharon had also been
irreplaceable in helping me set up the my new office so that it would be
ready for the Kleinfelder depositions the coming Tuesday. While Sharon
worked for us, she also ran errands, picked up the mail, and did whatever
was asked of her to help make our life easier. Among other things, Sharon
and Becky were to ensure that a carpet cleaner was retrieved from the North
Lakeview house for use at the house on Chaparral Drive, take a mirror and
other items out of the Lakeview house and install a key box at the Chaparral
Drive house.
Affidavit of Cyndi W. Gilbert (emphasis added). (R. 137, 75.)
Clearly, Defendant and Ms. Stamper had distinct assigmnent which they were to
complete. Defendant had mechanical work, new phone set up and training, errands, light
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bulb replacement, transporting mail, files and legal supplies, ordering flowers, and
handling issues for the Rodeo.
On the other hand, Decedent's tasks were almost entirely spent in cleaning and
running errands. Carpooling to an office together, after which you separate, work with
other persons, and do separate tasks requiring separate skills for separate and sometimes
related companies, can hardly be deemed to be acting as fellow servants. At no time has
Defendant argued that decedent did Diamond G Rodeo work. It was negligent driving
that killed Stamper, which had nothing to do with any tasks of Johnson and Stamper
which may have had some overlap later in the day in Mesquite.
Further highlighting the distinction between the work and responsibilities is
testimony by Mr. Steve Gilbert, owner of Gilbert Development and Diamond G Rodeo, as
follows:
Q.

[By Mr. Sutterfield] I understand they were employed by different
companies. You explained that to us, right?

A.

[By Mr. Gilbert] Well, Sharon [Stamper] has always been by Gilbert
Development Corporation because she has cleaned the offices, and there
are several offices. . . . And cooked for a lot of corporate — well, for
almost — I don't think there was ever a corporate party that she wasn't over.
And even if they were catered, she did all the setup. I mean there have been
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times we've got three, four hundred people at the party. . .. And just a
corporate deal And so she would set up the tables, make sure everything
there is in place, and of course there was a place for Becky [Johnson], Fred
and the ranch hands would jump in and help them set up corporate things
for Gilbert Development, whatever. . . . But she's - Sharon1 s

4

worketf lor < IIIIKTI Deu'l^iHiiuit juicf Uvt M always worked for the
rodeo [Diamond G Rode] because Sharon took care of for the most part
Gilbert Development Corporation, and Becky took c sire of;,;c llln^ rodeo
do1 'ills anuj bullfightei s and things of that nature (emphasis added.)
(R. 154.)
It seems clear that Ms. Stamper was almost exclusively involved in cooking and
cleaning for Gilbert Development while Defendant was almost exclusively engaged in the
work of Diamond G Rodeos.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Gilbert testified that there was "continuous
crossover" between duties assigned to Ms. Stamper and Defendant. Plaintiffs do dispute
that in fact there was "continuous crossover" between the assignments given to fvIs.
Stamper and Defendant, especially on the day of the crash. The depositions of Mr.
Gilbert and of Defendant, when read as a whole, suggest that Ms. Stamper was usually
involved in cooking and cleaning for Gilbert Development while Defendant was almost
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exclusively engaged in the work of Diamond G Rodeos which included some overlap in
common projects. See Johnson Depo. pages 19-27 and Gilbert Depo. pages 25-27. (R.
120, 152, 128-126.) The fact that separately employed persons were involved in similar
work in cleaning and organizing offices and transporting various files in both Diamond G
and Gilbert Development does not make them shared or fellow servants under the law for
injury claims.
Additionally, Ms. Stamper and Defendant had widely varying skills sets which
indicates that they actually did not do as much "crossover" work as suggested by
Defendant. Defendant describes herself in her deposition as a "computer specialist" and
indicates that she did welding, landscaping, electrical work, and data entry. Similarly,
Defendant was heavily involved in rodeo production for Diamond G Rodeo. Defendant
was engaged in a wide range of activities concerning the rodeo production including:
feeding, sorting, unloading, vaccinating and scoring animals, marketing, and scheduling
of clowns, See Johnson Depo. pages 12, 14-17, 19,28. (R. 130-128.) In contrast, Ms.
Stamper was heavily involved in cooking and cleaning:
Q.

[By Mr. Sutterfield]: Was there a pecking order in terms of their
relationship in terms of who was more of the boss? Were they on an equal
footing if they did things together: Did you mostly rely on [Defendant] to
direct the affairs of the work and tell her what to do or was it [Ms.
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Stamper]?
A.

[By Mr. Gilbert]: No. [Defendant] had nothing to do with [Ms. Stamper]
as far as direction. [Ms. Stamper] basically handled deiiuiii" off ires and
taking care of catering for anything for Gilbert Development
Corporation parties, cleanup after them, cook (emphasis added). [Ms.
Stamper] did a lot of cooking either in Mesquite 01 1111 mr A lot of (he
time, you know, large corporations will say we're going to have a meeting
and we just eat it at the house and sit on the patio and talk, and [Ms.
Stamper] v\ imid cook. She was a great cook. So she would cook and clean
up and all that. But she had nothing to do with [Defendant].

Gilbert Depo. pages 25-26. (R. 20.)
In short, the evidence suggests that Ms. Stamper and Defendant operated in
distinct spheres, doing distinct work for different companies, and sometimes Defendant
was engaged in minimal or nominal "crossover" work.
On the day of the accident, "Becky and Sharon were again coming from
Toquerville to Mesquite at [Ms. Gilbert's] direction to finish the tasks necessary to
complete the office move." Affidavit of Cyncii \\ Gilbert. (R. 136, 75-74.) In sum,
during the days leading up to the auto accident Defendant and Ms. Stamper were given
distinct and separate assignments to assist in the move. Ms. Stamper was to finish her
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assignments and Defendant was to finish her assignments.
On the day of the accident, Ms. Stamper and Defendant began to carpool to
Mesquite so as to finish their individual work. This division of labor is hardly the
working situation, nexus in time, and manner of activities where influence and conduct
can be effected relating to the injury contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in the
cases cited by the parties.
Each woman had distinct tasks to perform. At the time of her death. Stamper had
no opportunity to "exercise an influence upon [Johnson] to use proper caution and be
situated in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of
each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness . . . " Peterson, 492 P.2d at 1000. This is
especially true when Defendant always drove the vehicle when she was with the
Decedent. See Johnson depo at 21-22. (R. 136). "Sharon [Stamper] never drove." For
the foregoing reasons, Ms. Stamper and Defendant may not properly be defined as
"fellow servants."
II.

UTAH LAW DISFAVORS SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE ARE
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS.
As the court is well aware, summary judgment is disfavored when there are

disputed material facts and even when the understanding, intention and consequences of
facts are disputed. Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1977). Similarly, when
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considering a motion for summary judgment all facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Bowen v. Riverton City, d>6 P.2d 4334 436
(Utah 1982).
A.

The Lower Court Improperly Granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment When Disputed Material Facts Exist

Assuming, arguendo, the fellow servant doctrine applies to the facts of this case,
there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The "fellow
servants" doctrine is one based in common law. The Supreme Court of Utah has long
held that while the definition of "fellow servants" may be a question of law, whether
individuals of any particular case fall under that definition is generally a question of fact.
Doubtless the question whether two or more servants, working for the
same master, are fellow-servants, usually depends upon a variety of facts
and is therefore a question of fact. The definition of fellow-servants,
however, may be a question of law for the court, but it is a question of fact,
to be determined from the proof, whether the case is such as to fall within
the definition (citations omitted). In the case at bar the court stated the
definition of fellow-servants in the language of the statute, and submitted
the question whether, under the facts and circumstances in evidence, the
relation of fellow-servants existed, to the jury. This was proper . ..
(emphasis added).
Braegger v. Oregon S.L.R.R.. 24 Utah 391, 396 (1902); See also Merrill v. Oregon
S.L.R.R.. 29 Utah 264 (1905).
In describing its reasoning in its Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, the lower court cited numerous facts
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that it deemed to be undisputed.
First, the lower court stated, "the course of dealing within the two closely held
corporations demonstrates a substantial overlap between the duties of each employee
performed." (R. 205.) In support of this proposition, the court cites to testimony by the
Mr. Steve Gilbert, owner of Gilbert Development and Diamond G Rodeo, as follows:
Mr. Gilbert testified about Ms. Johnson, "I will say she did Gilbert
Development chores or intermediate stuff periodically all the time, but she
got paid by Diamond G Rodeos. But there was continuous crossover.
(R. 205.)
Plaintiff does not disagree that Mr. Gilbert made this statement; however,
Plaintiffs dispute that this characterization of Ms. Johnson's work is accurate. There are
material facts that indicate that Ms. Stamper always worked for GDC doing cleaning and
cooking type work while that Ms. Johnson was primarily and almost exclusively involved
with Diamond G Rodeo affairs, which included, from time to time, work on GDC
projects. Mr. Gilbert testified:
Q.

[By Mr. Sutterfield] I understand they were employed by different
companies. You explained that to us, right?

A.

[By Mr. Gilbert] Well, Sharon [Stamper] has always been by Gilbert
Development Corporation because she has cleaned the offices, and there
are several offices. . . . And cooked for a lot of corporate — well, for
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almost - 1 don't think there was ever a corporate party that she wasn't over.
And even if they were catered, she did all the setup. I mean there have been
times we've got three, four hundred people at the party. . .. And just a
corporate deal. And so she would set up the tables, make sure everything
there is in place, and of course there was a place for Becky [Johnson], Fred
and the ranch hands would jump in and help them set up corporate things
for Gilbert Development, whatever. . . . But she's ~ Sharonfs always
worked for Gilbert Development and Becky always worked for the
rodeo [Diamond G Rode] because Sharon took care of for the most part
Gilbert Development Corporation, and Becky took care of getting rodeo
clowns and bullfighters and things of that nature (emphasis added).
(R. 154.)
The record indicates that Ms. Stamper and Defendant had widely varying skills
sets which indicates that they actually did not do as much "crossover" work as suggested
by Defendant. See Johnson Depo. pages 19, 28 (R. 155, 154,146, 129, 128, 126, 66.)
Defendant describes herself as a "computer specialist" and indicates that she did welding,
landscaping, electrical work, telephone set up, and training. Similarly, Defendant was
heavily involved in rodeo production for Diamond G Rodeo including: traveling,
marketing, scheduling of clowns and bull fighters, scoring, and feeding and vaccinating
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animals. I± In contrast, Ms. Stamper was heavily involved in cooking and cleaning:
Q.

[By Mr. Sutterfield]: Was there a pecking order in terms of their
relationship in terms of who was more of the boss? Were they on an equal
footing if they did things together: Did you mostly rely on [Defendant] to
direct the affairs of the work and tell her what to do or was it [Ms.
Stamper]?

A.

[By Mr. Gilbert]: No. [Defendant] had nothing to do with [Ms. Stamper]
as far as direction. [Ms. Stamper] basically handled cleaning offices and
taking care of catering for anything for Gilbert Development
Corporation parties, cleanup after them, cook (emphasis added). [Ms.
Stamper] did a lot of cooking either in Mesquite or in our. A lot of the time,
you know, large corporations will say we're going to have a meeting and
we just eat it at the house and sit on the patio and talk, and [Ms. Stamper]
would cook. She was a great cook. So she would cook and clean up and all
that. But she had nothing to do with [Defendant].

Gilbert Depo. pages 25-26. (R. 120.)
In short, the lower court ignored evidence suggesting that Ms. Stamper and
Defendant operated in distinct spheres, doing distinct work for different companies and
only engaged in mhiimal or nominal "crossover" work.
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The lower court also held that "the undisputed facts show Ms. Stamper and Ms.
Johnson traveled together between various job sites during working periods frequently
during six months preceding this accident." (R. 204.) However, the court ignored the date
and time of the injury and evidence that upon arrival in Mesquite, Ms. Stamper and
Defendant did distinct work with other persons upon arriving at those destinations. It is
clearfromthe record that Defendant and Ms. Stamper routinely engaged in different tasks
and work after carpooling together from Toquerville to Mesquite, and that these distinct
tasks occurred during the week of May 2-5, 2005 as described by Ms. Gilbert's affidavit.
These facts contradict the conclusion that Ms. Stamper and Defendant engaged in
the same work after arriving in Mesquite or that they were or would have been fellow
servants in their duties on May 6, 2005. Ms. Gilbert's own affidavit indicates, or at the
very least raises issues of fact, that Johnson was intended to do separate work for
Diamond G. Rodeo on May 6,2005, including:
(a)

getting the phone system up and running (benefitting both GDC and

Diamond G) and training the Gilberts on its use;
(b)

determining what light bulbs worked in the two homes and office

(benefitting both GDC and Diamond G);
(c)

transporting mail and files to andfromToquerville (benefitting both);

(d)

transporting legal supplies (benefitting both);
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(e)

handling rodeo logistical issues (benefitting Diamond G, Rodeo only)

(emphasis added); and
(f)

working with Steve Gilbert as required (benefitting one or both entities).

(R. 75-74.)
Assuming arguendo, the fellow servant doctrine applies, the jury should be
allowed to determine whether the relationship of fellow servants existed as to Stamper
and Johnson's duties on May 6, 2005. (R. 149-147.)
The lower court ignored these disputed facts and did not view them in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs as required by law.
Ms. Stamper and Defendant are fellow servants if, among other considerations,
they had "such personal relations" which allowed them to "exercise an influence upon
each other of proper caution in respect of their mutual safety." This determination must
be made "at the time of injury directly operating with each other in the particular business
at hand." Peterson v. Fowler, 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1972) (emphasis added).
While appellants believe this Court can determine the issue for correctness that the
fellow servant doctrine does not apply to this case, assuming, arguendo, it has
application, this type of fact intensive inquiry is precisely the type of question to be
presented to a trier of fact.
A jury could find that (a) because the death of Ms. Stamper was caused by the
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sudden and unanticipated rolling over of a vehicle there would have been nothing Ms.
Stamper could have done to exercise any meaningful influence upon Defendant with
respect to "proper caution" or "their mutual safety"; (b) there did not exist such a personal
relationship to allow such influence by Stamper who never drove; (c) the anticipated
duties of each person to be performed on May 6, 2005 would not have placed these two
separately employed persons in such co-association that Stamper could exercise an
influence upon Johnson to use proper caution or to watch Johnson's conduct; or (d) there
was insufficient crossover in their expected duties that day with Johnson primarily
engaged in Diamond G. work and Stamper engaged in GDC office and home cleaning
work. A positive jury finding on any of the four alternatives would defeat the fellow
servant exclusion and allow Plaintiffs relief for the death of their mother.
A jury should receive an instruction giving them the legal definition or test of what
constitutes "fellow servants" and be allowed to apply the facts of this case in determining
if Ms. Stamper and Defendant fall within that definition.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellants request this Court reverse the trial court's Order Granting Summary
Judgment and rule that the fellow servant doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case.
Alternatively, this Court should reverse the trial court and order the court to allow the
Complaint to be amended to include Johnson's employer, Diamond G, and order a trial to
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be held on the issue of whether the activities engaged in by the two persons in this case at
the time of Stamper's death constitute them working as fellow servants for the same
employer.
DATED this /ffiday of May, 2009.
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD

-

>

_

Kevin J. Sutterfield
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ADDENDUM
1.
A copy of the Fifth Judicial District Court's Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
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f l F T H DISTRICT COURT

2006 DEC 11 PM I s 3 3
WASHINGTON COUNTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, S3TAIE-QF-U3PAH
JEFF STAMPER, AARON STAMPER,
DAVID STAMPER, CHRISTOPHER
STAMPER, the heirs and children of
SHARON STAMPER, deceased,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO AMEND

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 070500331
REBECCA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Judge Eric A. Ludlow

The Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend on October 22, 2008. Plaintiffs were represented by Kevin J. Sutterfield of
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C.; Defendant was represented by Robert C. Keller of Williams & Hunt.
The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel at the hearing and in the briefs, and having
reviewed the motions, the pleadings, and the other documents in this matter, now rules as follows:
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." However, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this

rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," id. at (e) [emphasis
added.] It is not sufficient, then, to merely offer an alternate interpretation of uncontroverted facts.
The Court determines that the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant and
Plaintiffs' decedent, Ms. Stamper, were co-employees at the time of the accident giving rise to this
action. The Court notes, as Plaintiffs point out, that Ms. Stamper's paycheck came from Gilbert
Development Corporation (GDC), while Ms. Johnson's came from Diamond G Rodeos, Inc., and
that Ms. Stamper's work involved a somewhat distinct "skill set" from Ms. Johnson's, and viceversa. However, the course of dealing within the two closely-held corporations demonstrates a
substantial overlap between the duties each employee performed. Mr. Gilbert testified about Ms.
Johnson, "I will say that she did Gilbert Development chores or intermediate stuff periodically all
the time, but she got paid by Diamond G Rodeos. But there was continuous crossover." (Steve
Gilbert Depo. 57:20-23.)* In paragraph 10 of her affidavit, Ms. Gilbert states regarding the
circumstances of the office move the week before the accident,
While [Ms. Stamper] worked for us, she also ran errands, picked up the mail, and did
whatever was asked of her to help make our life easier. Among other things, [Ms. Stamper
and Ms. Johnson] were to ensure that a carpet cleaner was retrieved from the North Lakeview
house for use at the house on Chaparral Drive, take a mirror and other item out of the
Lakeview house and install a key box at the Chaparral Drive house.

In regard to her job responsibilities, Ms. Johnson testified, "I pretty much did anything Steve
[Gilbert] needed me to do, whether it was with Diamond G Rodeos or Gilbert Development,
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Mr. Gilbert also testified in his deposition that though the women worked for different
entities and had different duties, "There was overlap all the time" (27:17). When Ms. Stamper
cooked for large corporate functions, for example, "Becky would certainly jump in and help ...
with whatever Sharon needed" (25:7-8).
2

anything that had to do with animals, helping with the construction at his new house, running ...
general business errands for Steve and/or for Cyndi [Gilbert]." (Johnson Depo. 12:8-13.)2 While
Plaintiffs list a number of duties that Ms. Johnson was performed that were outside Ms. Stamper's
expertise, it is not controverted that GDC's business was often mixed with that of Diamond G, and
Diamond G's with that of GDC.
More crucially, the undisputed facts also reveal that the accident occurred during a common
errand at the direction of the employer. Ms. Gilbert's affidavit states, "The accident occurred on
Friday, May 6th, 2005. On that day, [Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper] were again coming from
ToquerviUe to Mesquite at my direction to finish the office move. [Ms Stamper and Ms. Johnson]
often traveled together in company vehicles, and were driving a vehicle owned by GDC at the time
of the accident," *[[ 11. While Plaintiffs characterize the trips from the ToquerviUe operation to
Mesquite as merely incidental "carpooling," the undisputed facts show Ms. Stamper and Ms.
Johnson traveled together between the various job sites during working periods frequently during
the six months preceding the accident.
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act is a legislative determination that its provisions
should be an injured worker's exclusive remedy against her coworkers and employer in most cases.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l) states,
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer
and is the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil
2

Ms. Johnson also stated in her deposition, "I would assist Sharon sometimes in cleaning
the house and running errands for Cindy" (27:12-14); and, "[A]s for ... working side by side,
that's pretty much it, Steve, Cindy, myself, and Sharon"(28:20-21).
3

liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives,
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be
maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer
based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee....

[Emphases added.] In Black v. McDonald's, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme
Court discussed the "in the course of or because of or arising out o f language. It stated,
To be embraced within the ambit of "course of employment," the injury must be received
while the employee is carrying on the work which he is called upon to perform or doing
some act incidental thereto. Nadeau v. Town of South Berwick, 412 A.2d 392 (Me. 1980).
It must occur within the period of employment, at a place or area where the employee
may reasonably be, and while the employee is engaged in an activity at least incidental to
his employment. Ski World, Inc. v. Fife, 489 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. App. 1986). The activity
will be considered incidental to the employee's employment if it advances, directly or
indirectly, his employer's interests. Id. at 75.

Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were "called upon" to perform a particular task at the direction of
Ms. Gilbert, benefitting GDC and Diamond G.
The Utah Supreme Court defined fellow servants "as individuals engaged in the
same line of work and labor together in such personal relations that they can exercise an
influence upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect of their mutual safety.
They should be at the time of the injury directly operating with each other in the
particular business at hand, or they must be operating so that mutual duties bring them
into such co-association that they may exercise an influence upon each other to use proper
caution and be so situated in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and
watch the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness."
Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys., 32 F.3d 1450, 1452 (10th Cir. Utah 1994), quoting Peterson v.
Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1972); in accord, Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). At the time of the accident, Defendant and Ms. Stamper were, in
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carrying out the errand at Ms. Gilbert's direction, "directly operating with each other in the
particular business at hand." The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Johnson and Ms.
Stamper were engaged in the "same employment," and Plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred by
the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend is moot and is DENIED.
Dated this ______ day of December, 2008.

tiJA-gJLJUDGE ERIC A. LUDLOW
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
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